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Abstract 
 
This article examines the influence of Policy Mix coherence in Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). The paper innovates in two ways. First, through an interaction between 
the monetary conditions index and the primary structural fiscal balance, we highlight coherence-
type complementarities between monetary policy and fiscal policy with regard to their effects on 
economic activity. Second, we show that the influence of the coherence of policy mix on the effect 
of monetary policy is different according to the stance of the economy within the four possible 
regimes of policy mix, mostly in the WAEMU subsample, where integration is deeper than in the 
non-WAEMU countries, thanks to the common currency (the Franc CFA) they share. The analysis is 
based upon a panel dataset from 1990 to 2006 and remains robust to alternative specifications 
used to calculate the monetary conditions index. Our results contribute to the debate regarding 
the prospect of an ECOWAS-wide common currency. Indeed, given the heterogeneity in the 
economic structure of its members States, more policy mix coherence seems necessary to avoid 
unexpected impacts of monetary policy on economic activity. 
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1. Introduction 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), created in 1975 by the Treaty 
of Lagos, regroups 15 countries and constitutes the regional organization providing the framework 
for the integration process now underway in West Africa.1  Eight of these fifteen countries – Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo – belong to a smaller 
regional sub-group, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Although the 
WAEMU’s creation in 1994 followed that of the ECOWAS, internal coordination within the 
WAEMU has proceeded more quickly than within the ECOWAS. The common currency shared by 
WAEMU members, the Franc CFA, issued by Central Bank of West African States is the key factor 
behind the gap in the pace of integration. Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have 
decided in 2000 to create a second common currency zone called West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ) within the ECOWAS. 
The ultimate goal of this zone (ECOWAS) is to achieve both monetary and fiscal integration for 
all 15 countries, the latter objective being a corollary, if not a prerequisite of the first one. A merger 
between the two currency zones (the WAEMU and the WAMZ) is thus the long-term target. The 
institutional framework guiding ECOWAS policies is essentially twofold: the fiscal integration and 
the common currency project. ECOWAS’s fiscal integration framework is a set of benchmarks that 
promote fiscal governance. Similar to the standards criteria set out in the WAEMU’s Growth, 
Convergence and Stability Pact, ECOWAS’s economic convergence rules2 intend to consolidate 
both public finances and overall macroeconomic environment, creating the orderly and positive 
context needed for a successful transition to an ECOWAS-wide common currency. The plan for a 
common West African currency has existed since the establishment of the ECOWAS. Today, the 
basic pattern that shapes the various economic policies in the region consists of two phases: 
strengthen monetary integration within the WAEMU and achieve the creation of the WAMZ. Next, 
merge the two unions to obtain full monetary integration for ECOWAS. This monetary integration 
was planned for 2004, but awaits the creation of the WAMZ, which has been delayed by the 
inability of expected WAMZ members to meet the convergence criteria, either because of short-
term arbitrage with higher economic growth reasons, or due to political economy restrictions.  
                                                     
1
 The 15 ECOWAS member countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
2
 These rules are also ranked in two groups. The four criteria in the top group are as follows: not more than 4% of fiscal deficit; 
inflation rate under 5%; net reserves to cover at least three months’ exports, and central bank loans to revenue of not more than 10% 
of the previous year’s fiscal revenue. In the second set of criteria, six guidelines: no new arrears are permitted, and all existing arrears 
must be cleared; fiscal revenue equivalent to 20% of GDP; wage bill of maximum 35% of total fiscal revenue; government 
investment equivalent to at least 20% of total fiscal revenue; and stable exchange rates as well as positive levels of real interest rates 
maintained by each country. 
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However, a number of obstacles including divergent national economic structures have 
hampered this project. Given the broad diversity of the national economies involved, it seems not 
evident for a common central bank to introduce a monetary policy that is appropriate for each 
national context. 
Indeed, a substantial strand of the literature stressed out the importance of monetary and fiscal 
policy coordination mechanisms. First, a number of studies conducted outside the context of 
monetary unions have emphasized the pivotal role of coordinated policies in macroeconomic 
stabilization (Alesina et al., 1987; Villieu et al., 1998; and Beetsma et al., 1998). In the case of 
currency unions, studies have demonstrated that consistency in policy mix is even more important 
given that the survival of the union is at stake. With regard to the European monetary union, Fatas 
and Mihov (2002) and Gali and Perotti (2003) show that the need for increased coherence between 
national fiscal policies and the objective of a common currency led to enhanced fiscal discipline 
immediately prior to and after the launch of this currency. However, the short-lived nature of this 
corrective effect threatens the survival of the Union (Klein and Marion, 1997). With respect to 
monetary unions in Africa, Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) show that under certain conditions, 
monetary unions can enhance the credibility of government fiscal commitments. Debrun et al. 
(2002), in a study of the effects of monetary unions on fiscal discipline, conclude that the survival 
of an ECOWAS monetary union project can only be achieved by establishing rules, institutions and 
mutual monitoring processes that will give the union the role of a fiscal policy control agency. Ary 
Tanimoune and Plane (2005) and Ary Tanimoune, Combes and Plane (2008), focusing on the 
WAEMU, highlighted respectively the cohesion among member countries and the presence of non-
linear effects of fiscal policy within the union. Hefeker (2010) demonstrates that fiscal reform 
efforts made by monetary union countries are dependent on its level of asymmetry. Consequently, if 
the perspective of merging WAEMU and WAMZ takes place, the need for fiscal reform would 
become even clearer. This would make it more essential than ever an assessment of the impact of 
policy mix coherence on economic activity. 
The primary goal of this article is thus to examine the degree of influence exerted by policy mix 
coherence on the effects of monetary policy on economic activity. More specifically, this article 
tests the hypothesis that increased coherence between monetary and fiscal policies in ECOWAS 
countries would promote economic growth. The main contributions of this paper, derived from data 
provided by a 12-member ECOWAS panel, are twofold. First, through an interactive variable 
between the monetary conditions index (MCI) and the primary structural fiscal balance representing 
respectively the monetary policy trajectory and the fiscal policy trajectory, we highlight 
complementarity between the effects of monetary policy and the impacts of fiscal policy on 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.xx 
6 
 
economic activity. Second, we demonstrate that this influence of policy mix coherence can be 
differentiated not only based on the economy’s position within the four possible policy mix 
arrangements, but also relative to the two ECOWAS subsamples, namely the countries which 
already share a common currency in WAEMU on the one hand and the non-WAEMU countries on 
the other hand. Our results remain robust to alternative specifications used to calculate the MCI. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the variables used to assess 
policy mix considerations in ECOWAS. The econometric modeling is exposed in Section 3, and the 
results are displayed and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 consists of a brief conclusion and 
economic policy recommendations.  
2. Natures of Policy mix 
In this section, we present the interactive variable of the policy mix and its different natures. We 
first present the variable as the proxy of monetary policy, the monetary conditions index. Then, we 
discuss the nature of the indicator of fiscal policy, the primary structural fiscal balance. Finally, on 
the basis of these two variables, we discuss the monetary and fiscal coordination-types regimes. 
2.1. Monetary Conditions Index 
Let us consider the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) as a proxy of monetary policy 
orientation3. As defined in the literature, MCI is the weighted sum of the difference between the 
logarithm of the Central Bank real discount rate and its value of year base, and the difference 
between the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate (REER) and its value of the base year4. 
The MCI is given by equation (1),  
( ) ( )baseititiebaseititirit eerrMCI −+−= θθ                (1) 
The indices i and t refer respectively to country i and time period t. r represents the logarithm of the 
real discount rate and e, the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate. The MCI yields a 
synthetic indicator of monetary policy orientation, since it provides an evaluation of the joint effects 
of interest rate and exchange rate policies on aggregate demand. Given that an increase in real 
discount rate and REER represents respectively a restrictive Central Bank credit conditions and a 
real appreciation of the exchange rate, thus a higher MCI indicates a restrictive monetary policy. 
One of the challenges in calculating MCI is the choice of the base year. In the absence of an 
objective reference (such as equilibrium level), average values for considered analysis period are 
conventionally used as reference value (Diarisso and Samba Mamadou, 2000). The MCI is then a 
                                                     
3
 See Duguay (1994), Ericsson et al. (1998), Eika et al. (1996), and Aubert (2003). Also see Diarisso and Samba Mamadou (2000) 
for WAEMU. 
4
 Since the real discount rate contains both negative and positive values, log (r) is replaced by log (1+r).  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.xx 
7 
 
summary measure of monetary policy stance compared to the period average. The other major 
difficulty in calculating MCI is identifying the weight of each parameter. The method used by the 
central banks of Canada, France, and the West African states consists of deducting θir and θie from 
the estimation of the aggregate demand, which represents the link between real GDP variations 
(∆yit) to monetary policy instruments  (r and e)5. The aggregate demand function is such,  
itiit2iit1iti ery εηαα∆ +++=          (2) 
iη  denotes the time invariant features specific to each country and εit the error term6.  Estimated 
coefficients  1ˆiα  and 2ˆ iα  are used to compile the respective weights to be used in the logarithm of 
the real discount rate and the REER ( ieir et θθ ),  
21
1
ˆˆ
ˆ
ii
i
ir αα
αθ
+
=  and 
21
2
ˆˆ
ˆ
ii
i
ie αα
αθ
+
= . 
 
2.2. Primary structural fiscal balance  
The cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal balance, also known as primary structural balance, is 
used as an indicator of the nature of the fiscal policy. It is calculated as the estimated residual of the 
equation linking the primary fiscal balance ( itSBS ) to the difference between effective and potential 
GDP (output gap : itOG )7: 
itittiit wOGSBS += δ  (3) 
i refers to country i and t to time period t. wit is the error term; it represents the portion of the 
primary balance not derived from the economic cycle. As such, wit is considered as primary 
structural fiscal balance8. 
 
                                                     
5
 Other central banks such as New Zealand’s make use of aggregate demand function in which the dependent variable is the output 
gap (difference between the actual and the potential GDP). 
6
 For robustness, we use an alternative specification that allows us to control for specific effects by country, but using homogenous 
coefficients between countries (α1 and α2). The calculated MCI values related to choice whether or not to use homogenous from the 
aggregate demand function are not markedly different: the indicators resulting from both variations are highly correlated at about 
0.878 (see appendix 3).  
7
 The output gap is calculated as the difference between the logarithm of real GDP and its trend. The trend is obtained using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter of 100. We also conducted estimations with a smoothing parameter of 6.25, but 
the results were not significantly different. 
8
 We have used the primary structural fiscal balance instead of overall fiscal balance excluding grants (the principal criterion of fiscal 
convergence in ECOWAS) due to the lack of data over long enough periods for all countries. 
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2.3. Monetary and fiscal coordination-types regimes 
Policy mix is the joint orientation of monetary and fiscal policies. Interactions between 
monetary authorities and governments take the form of coordination for maximizing economic 
activity. A policy mix is said coherent when that interaction is in the same direction. For example, 
in a Keynesian perspective, an expansionary monetary policy should be implemented when fiscal 
policy is expansionary too. Similarly, in a perspective of coherence, it is expected that the monetary 
and fiscal policies are both restrictive. However, these patterns are not the only ones expressing the 
policy mix. Typically, it may be that monetary policy is accommodative while fiscal policy is 
restrictive, or vice versa. 
Let consider SBS  a proxy of the fiscal policy; MCI  a proxy of the nature of the monetary 
policy and MCISBS * an interactive variable of the policy mix. In order to distinguish between 
monetary policy effects, we have disaggregated the MCI into a combination of two indicators: 
MCI_sup that represents restrictive monetary policy “regime” and MCI_inf, the expansionary 
monetary policy “regime”. For each country, we have set MCI_sup as equal to MCI if MCI is equal 
or greater than median value of MCI (MCImedian) for that country, and 0 otherwise. At the opposite, 
MCI_inf is equal to MCI if MCI is lower than MCImedian and 0 otherwise9:  


 ≥
=
otherwise 0
   if  
sup_ median
MCIMCIMCI
MCI
 and  

 <
=
otherwise 0
   if  
inf_ median
MCIMCIMCI
MCI
  
In a similar way, the primary structural fiscal balance is also disaggregated into two 
indicators: SBS_sup to sketch a restrictive fiscal “regime” and SBS_inf for an expansionist fiscal 
“regime”. For each country, SBS_sup is equal to SBS if SBS is equal to or greater than 0 (level of a 
balanced SBS), and SBS_sup is equal to 0 otherwise; SBS_inf is equal to SBS if SBS is lower than 0 
and SBS_inf is equal to 0 otherwise10: 


 ≥
=
otherwise 0
 0  if  
sup_
SBSSBS
SBS
 and  

 <
=
otherwise 0
 0 if  
inf_
SBSSBS
SBS
 
In order to determine the (non)coherent-type of policy mix regime, we have divided the 
policy mix indicator into four interactive variables that can be classified in two groups. On the one 
hand, we have the coherent regimes with MCI_sup*SBS_sup  a restrictive policy mix regime; 
MCI_inf*SBS_inf an expansionary policy mix regime. On the other hand, it remains the non-
coherent (or indeterminate) policy mix regimes, that is to say MCI_inf*SBS_sup and 
MCI_sup*SBS_inf . Note that the sum of these four interactive variables is equal to the single 
                                                     
9
 Note that MCI_sup + MCI_inf = MCI*Dummy[1| MCI ≥ MCImédian] +MCI* Dummy[1| MCI <MCImédian]=MCI 
10
 Note that SBS_sup + SBS_inf = SBS*Dummy[1| SB ≥ 0] + SBS*Dummy[1| SBS<0]= SBS 
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interactive variable ( MCI*SBS )11. The four policy mix regimes and their expected signs on 
economic activity on a Keynesian perspective are represented in the quadrant (Fig.1), below: 
Figure 1: Policy mix regimes 
 
3. Modeling policy mix and data 
In this section, we introduce the econometric models followed by the presentation of data. 
3.1. Econometric models 
One of our objectives is to underline the influence of policy mix coherence on economic 
activity. We proceed in two steps. First, we estimate a “basic” equation as follows, 
ititititititiit XMCISBSMCISBSy µφλγγα +++++=∆ *21       (4) 
∆yit is the real GDP growth rate of country i in year t, and Xit is a vector of control variables 
including external debt, terms of trade volatility, institutional quality as reflected in the control of 
corruption, political stability and official development assistance. iα  represents country fixed 
effects, while itµ  is the error term. 
Given the possible different policy mix regimes as discussed previously, a negative sign of 
λ  is not sufficient to conclude to a Keynesian hypothesis of a coherence-type complementarity 
between for example an expected recessionary effect of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies ( 1γ
< 0 and 2γ <0). Indeed, a closer analysis of effects resulting from different combinations of SBS  
                                                     
11
 After factorizing and given that (MCI_sup+MCI_inf)=MCI and (SBS_sup+SBS_inf)=SBS, the sum is equal to MCI*SBS. 
 Expansionist fiscal policy (-) 
 
 
 
 
 Regime 2:  Regime 4:  
    
 
 
 
 Restrictive monetary Expansionist monetary 
 policy (+) policy (-) 
 
 
 
 Regime 1:  Regime 3:  
    
 
 
 
 
 Restrictive fiscal Policy (+) 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.xx 
10 
 
and MCI  is somewhat needed. The second step consists of estimating a “refined” model that 
includes the different policy mix regimes. Thus, the equation to estimate becomes, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) itititit4itit3
itit2itit1it2it1iit
XinfMCI*infSBSinfMCI*supSBS
supMCI*infSBSsupMCI*supSBSMCISBSy
µφλλ
λλγγα∆
++++
++++=
−−−−
−−−−
 (5) 
Still in a Keynesian perspective (which also underlies the calculations of the MCI in section 2), we 
expect 1γ < 0, 2γ <0, 1λ <0, 2λ <0, 3λ < >0 and 4λ >0.12 We estimate equations (4) and (5) using the 
panel Method of Fixed Effects with bootstrapped standard errors (given that two explaining 
variables, namely the MCI and SBS have been derived from previous estimated equations). 
 
3.2. Data 
The analysis covers ECOWAS countries (except Cape Verde, Liberia and Sierra Leone) from 
1990 to 2006 due to availability of data. The Central Bank discount rate data are taken from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2007). The real effective exchange rate data are from the 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International database (CERDI, 2007). The 
primary fiscal balance data are those of the World Economic Outlook (WEO, 2009) and real GDP 
growth rate are from World Development Indicators (WDI, 2010)13.  
From the evolution of the monetary conditions index presented below in Figure 2, it appears a 
major break in 1994 for WAEMU countries. This break represents the devaluation of the franc 
CFA, a typical measurement of restrictive monetary policy. This is probably why the rupture is less 
pronounced in the non-WAEMU countries. On the side of the nature of fiscal policy, represented by the 
primary structural fiscal balance, no clear pattern emerges from Figure 3. 
  
                                                     
12
 See Appendix 4 for a detailed analysis of the expected signs associated with the variables of interest. 
13
 Further information on the definitions and descriptive statistics of these variables can be found in Appendices 1 and 2 respectively. 
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Figure 2: Monetary Conditions Index in ECOWAS countries: 1990-2006* 
 
 *: Based on heterogeneous coefficients in the aggregate demand. Sources: Authors’ calculations, based on IFS (2007) and CERDI (2007) data. 
 
 
Figure 3: Primary Structural Fiscal Balance in ECOWAS countries: 1990-2006 
   
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on WEO (2009) data. 
 
4. Results and discussion  
Table 1 below shows the results of the basic model estimation. The MCI in this instance was 
obtained using a specific weight for each country. Given that MCI and SBS , the variables of 
interest, were calculated using parameters from a prior estimation of equations, the estimation of 
equations (4) and (5) with the simple Fixed Effects estimator would result in biased standard errors 
-
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(Pagan, 1984). To remedy this problem, the regression standard errors were bootstrapped with 500 
iterations. 
Column [1] of Table 1 shows the results for all 12 ECOWAS countries: the MCI and SBS  
estimated coefficients have the expected signs. The MCI  seems to have a negative and significant 
impact on the economic growth rate: a one-point increase in the MCI lowers the economic growth 
rate by 1.11 percentage points in ECOWAS countries. However, the structural budget balance 
seems not to affect significantly economic growth. The control variables also appear with the 
expected signs: external debt coefficient is positive. That seems to demonstrate that debt in 
ECOWAS countries is contained within sustainable limits with no negative impact on economic 
activities. Also, the quality of institutions, as approximated by control of corruption, favorably 
impacts economic activity. The estimated coefficients of political stability and official development 
assistances, while appearing with the expected positive signs, seem to be not statistically significant. 
At the opposite, the terms of trade volatility seems to burden heavily economic activities in 
ECOWAS. Column [2] in Table 1 illustrates the results from WAEMU. The estimated MCI
coefficient remains negative; the fiscal balance now has a significant negative impact on economic 
activity. The last column of Table 1 shows results for non-WEAMU members of ECOWAS. These 
results are very close to those in the overall sample in both qualitative and quantitative terms. 
Table 1: Influence of Policy mix coherence in ECOWAS over 1990-2006 (basic model) 
Dependent Variable : Real GDP Growth 
ECOWAS 
countries 
WAEMU 
countries 
Non-WAEMU1 
countries 
(1) (2) (3) 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) -1.109*** -0.905*** -1.525*** 
 (0.202) (0.217) (0.342) 
Structural Primary Fiscal Balance (SBS) -0.069 -0.260** -0.062 
 (0.071) (0.124) (0.082) 
MCI*SBS -1.325** -4.583** -1.383*** 
 (0.579) (2.269) (0.483) 
External Debt/GDP 0.056* 0.129*** 0.043 
 (0.032) (0.050) (0.034) 
Instability of Terms of Trade -0.010*** -0.010** -0.009* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Control of  Corruption 0.101*** 0.070** 0.156 
 (0.038) (0.033) (0.123) 
Political Stability 0.015 0.021 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) 
Public Aid/GDP 0.470 0.770 -0.545 
 (0.532) (0.754) (0.537) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 187 119 68 
R2 0.400 0.307 0.597 
Wald Test (MCI=0, SBS =0, MCI*SBS =0): 
Chi-Square [P-value] 36.37 [0.000] 18.46 [0.000] 31.67 [0.000] 
1: Except Cape Verde, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Bootstrapped (via 500 replications) standard errors in bracket. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant 
included (but not reported) 
 
From all three columns, it appears that the policy mix ( )SBS*MCI  coefficient has the 
expected negative sign and is significantly different from zero, indicating that restrictive monetary 
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policy and restrictive fiscal policy feed positively on each other to undermine economic activity14. 
In particular, for WAEMU countries, that coefficient is almost three times greater than the one 
estimated for all ECOWAS and even the non-WAEMU countries. These results seem to highlight 
the expected fact that policy mix coherence has an influence on the individual effect of monetary 
( )MCI or fiscal ( )SBS  policy on economic activity, especially in the WAEMU where monetary 
integration is more advanced. Nevertheless, as indicated at the previous section, an estimated 
negative coefficient of the interactive variable is not relevant to assess the total impact of monetary 
or fiscal policy on economic activity. Estimations based on disaggregated policy mix variables are 
thus carried out. The results are depicted in Table 2. 
Two important results emerge from the first column of Table 2. Firstly, when policy mix is 
coherent, that is to say either in restrictive ( )SBS_sup*MCI_sup  or expansionary 
( )SBS_inf*MCI_inf  regime, the total marginal effect of restrictive monetary conditions seems to 
be recessionary in ECOWAS. Specifically, in the regime of “coherent-restrictive” policy mix, the 
recessionary effect of a restrictive monetary policy seems to appear even more marked than fiscal 
policy is also restrictive. This is typically a Keynesian effect. On the other side, in the case of 
“coherent-expansionist” policy mix, an expansionist fiscal policy seems to strengthen the 
recessionary effect of a restrictive monetary policy. That may be explained by the fact that a 
restrictive monetary policy implemented in an undisciplined fiscal context leads to a growing debt 
burden. As a result, there would be an increased inflationary pressure due to private sector 
anticipation of monetization of the government deficit, consistently with the unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). The second main result is that when the policy mix is 
incoherent ( )SBS_sup*MCI_infSBS_inf*MCI_sup or  , the marginal effect of monetary policy 
sends an ambivalent signal, since the recessionary effect of restrictive monetary conditions can be 
offset by the expansionist fiscal policy15. 
  
                                                     
14
 The Wald test for the joint significance of the coefficients of variables MCI, SBS and MCI*SBS also shows that these 3 
coefficients are jointly significant. 
15
 For a detailed analysis of the disaggregation of the marginal effects of monetary policy according to policy mix 
regimens, see Appendix 4. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.xx 
14 
 
Table 2: Influence of Policy mix coherence in ECOWAS over 1990-2006 (refined model) 
Dependent Variable : Real GDP Growth 
ECOWAS 
countries 
WAEMU 
countries 
Non-WAEMU1 
countries 
(1) (2) (3) 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) -0.890*** -1.210*** -1.066* 
 (0.214) (0.399) (0.624) 
Structural Primary Fiscal Balance (SBS) -0.053 -0.089 -0.026 
 (0.090) (0.170) (0.101) 
MCI_sup*SBS_sup -1.720* 6.651 -1.942* 
 (0.877) (7.974) (0.991) 
MCI_sup*SBS_inf -2.043* -11.08*** -1.905* 
 (1.042) (4.227) (0.972) 
MCI_inf*SBS_sup -0.680 1.690 -0.436 
 (2.001) (7.330) (3.340) 
MCI_inf*SBS_inf 3.532* -2.812 3.268 
 (1.802) (8.209) (3.588) 
External Debt/GDP 0.046* 0.134*** 0.037 
 (0.027) (0.044) (0.034) 
Terms of Trade Volatility -0.009*** -0.009** -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Control of  Corruption 0.088*** 0.067* 0.071 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.115) 
Political Stability 0.018* 0.025 0.006 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) 
Public Aid/GDP 0.601 0.764 -0.448 
 (0.578) (0.683) (0.498) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 187 119 68 
R2 0.442 0.327 0.665 
Wald Test (MCI=0; SBS=0; MCI_sup*SBS_sup=0; MCI_sup*SBS_inf=0; MCI_inf*SBS_sup=0; MCI_inf*SBS_inf=0): 
Chi-Square [P-value] 53.32 [0.000] 18.89 [0.004] 23.72 [0.000] 
1: Except Cape Verde, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Bootstrapped ( 500 replications) standard errors in bracket. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant 
included (not reported) 
 
Column 2 in Table 2 illustrates the effects based on differentiated policy mix regimes in 
WAEMU. These results show that inconsistent policy mix situations are the only ones that have a 
significant influence on the effect of monetary conditions on economic activity. However, the 
marginal impact of monetary policy in these situations is undetermined. By contrast, in the cases of 
coherent policy mix, the effects of monetary policy seem not to have a relevant link with the nature 
of the fiscal policy, probably because of the prevailing coordination provided by the WAEMU 
Economic and Growth Stability Pact implemented within the union. 
In order to test the validity of results for the specification used, an alternative specification of 
the estimation of the aggregated demand equation was substituted. The MCI ’s were then calculated 
based on estimations equation of the aggregated demand using equal weights for each country. The 
results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those noted above, except for the estimated 
coefficient of SBS_inf*MCI_sup that then becomes statistically significant, whereas that of 
SBS_sup*MCI_sup  becomes insignificant16. 
  
                                                     
16
 The robustness test for both the basic model and the refined model appear in Appendix 5. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have highlighted the role of policy mix coherence on economic activity in 
ECOWAS from 1990 to 2006. In ECOWAS, little has been said about the coherence of policy mix. 
Our contribution to the literature on policy mix coherence in monetary unions is twofold. 
First, based on monetary conditions index and the structural primary fiscal balance (used to 
assess the orientations of respectively monetary and fiscal policies in ECOWAS), we have shown 
that a “coherent-restrictive” policy mix amplifies the recessionary effect on economic activity of 
monetary and fiscal policies separately considered. Second, we have identified heterogeneities 
regarding monetary impacts on economic activity influenced by different regimes of policy mix. 
Indeed, the disaggregation of the policy mix interactive variable into four possible combinations of 
monetary-fiscal policies orientation allowed us to demonstrate that the total marginal effect of 
monetary policy is conditional to (none-)coherence-type of the policy. Our results corroborate the 
idea that the influence of coordinated policy mix is more pronounced in monetary unions, as 
illustrated by the WAEMU sub-sample. When policy mix in these countries is coordinated, the 
effect of monetary policy is no longer dependent on fiscal policy. This effect becomes ambivalent, 
or even unintended, in the absence of coordination. 
These results, which remained robust to alternative specifications used to calculate the MCI,  
have major policy implications for a potential transition to a common currency within ECOWAS. A 
common currency signals the end of national control over monetary policy. To minimize the 
potential negative impacts on growth resulting for such scenario, coordination between national 
fiscal policies must be ensured. Otherwise, the policy mix is likely to be incoherent, exerting 
unintended influence on the effects of monetary policy on economic activity, and undermining or 
even offsetting the positive effects expected from the common currency. This scenario would 
seriously erode momentum toward monetary integration or threaten the survival of an existing one. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Sources and Definitions of Data 
Variables Definition Sources 
Real discount rate Central bank discount rate adjusted for inflation IFS (2007) 
 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) 
 
Weighted mean of bilateral exchange rates adjusted for 
inflation differential between 2 countries. The weights 
used are those of the top 10 trading partners (import + 
export) 
CERDI (2007) 
Primary structural fiscal balance (SBS) Cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal balance, as GDP percentage. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on WEO (2009) 
Monetary conditions index  (MCI) 
Weighted mean of the difference between the logarithm of 
the real discount rate and its historic mean and the 
difference between the REER logarithm and its historic 
mean. The weights come from the estimations of the 
aggregated demand. 
Authors’ calculations 
SBS_sup Restrictive fiscal regime. Variable equal to SBS if SBS ≥0, and 0 otherwise Authors’ calculations 
SBS_inf Expansionist fiscal regime. Variable equal to SBS if SBS < 0, and 0 otherwise. Authors’ calculations 
MCI_sup 
Restrictive monetary regime. Variable equal to  
MCI if MCI ≥ MCImédian, and 0 otherwise Authors’ calculations 
MCI_inf Expansionist monetary regime. Variable equal to  
MCI if MCI < MCImédian, and 0 otherwise 
Authors’ calculations 
Real  GDP growth rate Annual GDP (at constant prices) variation rate  WDI (2010) 
 
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Standard error Min Max 
ECOWAS 
Monetary conditions index (MCI) 204 -6.8e-09 0.1029 -0.3161 0.3719 
MCI (model with homogenous coefficients) 204 3.65e-09 0.1008 -0.2836 0.3847 
Primary structural fiscal balance (SBS) 204 2.4e-09 0.6013 -6.0112 2.6907 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) 204 85.885 34.953 45.881 359.27 
Real discount rate 204 0.0208 0.0946 -0.3429 0.1957 
Primary fiscal balance 204 -0.0677 1.0121 -12.738 2.6482 
Output gap 204 -0.0186 0.1319 -0.9577 0.4008 
Real GDP Growth rate 204 1.0440 0.7164 0 4.3491 
External Debt/GDP 204 -0.086 1.403 -16.580 1.935 
Public Aid/GDP 204 0.1353 0.1132 0.0037 0.7400 
Terms of Trade Volatility 204 12.712 8.467 0.363 39.388 
Political Stability 187 7.603 2.209 2.333 11.000 
Control of  Corruption 187 2.429 0.833 0 4.000 
 
Appendix 3: Partial correlation between the two methods of MCI calculation 
 
MCI 
(with heterogeneous coefficients) 
MCI 
(with homogenous coefficients) 
MCI (with heterogeneous coefficients) 1.0000  
MCI (with homogenous coefficients) 0.8786* 1.0000 
 
Appendix 4: Signs of MCI subject to policy mix regimes (Keynesian perspective) 
 Regime 1: 
MCI_sup*SBS_sup 
Regime 2: 
MCI_sup*SBS_inf 
Regime 3: 
MCI_inf*SBS_sup 
Regime 4: 
MCI_inf*SBS_inf 
Marginal effect MCI in a case of 
balanced fiscal balance (SBS=0) - - - - 
Expected sign of MCI*SBS: (A) - - ? + 
Expected sign of SBS: (B) + - + - 
Expected sign of (A*B) - + ? - 
Total marginal effect of MCI - - - + - ? - - 
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Appendix 5: Monetary Conditions Index (with homogenous coefficients in the aggregate 
demand function) in ECOWAS countries: 1990-2006  
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, based on IFS (2007) and CERDI (2007) data. 
 
Table 3: Robustness Checks (basic Model) 
Dependent Variable : Real GDP Growth 
ECOWAS 
countries 
WAEMU 
countries 
Non-WAEMU1 
countries 
(1) (2) (3) 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) -1.010*** -0.618*** -1.590*** 
 (0.190) (0.239) (0.306) 
Structural Primary Fiscal Balance (SBS) -0.072 -0.223* -0.078 
 (0.083) (0.126) (0.097) 
MCI*SBS -1.437** -4.189* -1.723*** 
 (0.664) (2.404) (0.561) 
External Debt/GDP 0.064* 0.132*** 0.050 
 (0.037) (0.049) (0.044) 
Instability of Terms of Trade -0.010*** -0.010** -0.009* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Control of  Corruption 0.080** 0.057* 0.162 
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.155) 
Political Stability 0.022* 0.027* 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.024) 
Public Aid/GDP 0.553 0.912 -0.252 
 (0.527) (0.728) (0.574) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 187 119 68 
R2 0.342 0.271 0.528 
Wald Test (MCI=0, SBS =0, MCI*SBS =0): 
Chi-Square [P-value] 34.82 [0.000] 8.33 [0.039] 27.92 [0.000] 
1: Except Cape Verde, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Bootstrapped (via 500 replications) standard errors in bracket. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant included 
(but not reported) 
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
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Table 4: Robustness Checks (Refined Model) 
Dependent Variable : Real GDP Growth 
ECOWAS 
countries 
WAEMU 
countries 
Non-WAEMU1 
countries 
(1) (2) (3) 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) -0.760*** -0.812* -1.125** 
 (0.198) (0.449) (0.492) 
Structural Primary Fiscal Balance (SBS) -0.038 -0.158 -0.019 
 (0.139) (0.229) (0.160) 
MCI_sup*SBS_sup -2.740* 5.605 -2.903 
 (1.398) (9.031) (4.245) 
MCI_sup*SBS_inf -1.931* -9.115* -2.096* 
 (.985) (5.220) (1.069) 
MCI_inf*SBS_sup -0.658 -2.553 -0.317 
 (2.289) (8.582) (3.722) 
MCI_inf*SBS_inf 5.203* -0.601 4.899* 
 (2.976) (12.23) (2.499) 
External Debt/GDP 0.051* 0.143** 0.039 
 (0.026) (0.062) (0.051) 
Instability of Terms of Trade -0.009*** -0.009** -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Control of  Corruption 0.069** 0.058* 0.054 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.141) 
Political Stability 0.024* 0.033* 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) 
Public Aid/GDP 0.664 0.888 -0.259 
 (0.530) (0.747) (0.518) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 187 119 68 
R2 0.392 0.286 0.616 
Wald Test (MCI=0; SBS=0; MCI_sup*SBS_sup=0; MCI_sup*SBS_inf=0; MCI_inf*SBS_sup=0; 
MCI_inf*SBS_inf=0): 
Chi-Square [P-value] 31.66 [0.000] 14.81 [0.022] 17.70 [0.007] 
1: Except Cape Verde, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Bootstrapped (via 500 replications) standard errors in bracket. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant included 
(not reported) 
 
 
